LLRC: One for the Road!
N Sathiya Moorthy
The timely
announcement on the setting up of official mechanisms for the implementation of
the Report of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) should be
welcome for more reasons than one. On the face of it, the Roadmap on the LLRC
Report implementation seeks to address the concerns, real and otherwise,
expressed in and by the US-sponsored Geneva resolution of the UNHRC. Even more
importantly, it has fixed responsibility and accountability on officials across
the board and down the line on post-war national efforts at rehabilitation,
reconstruction and reconciliation, nearer home, for addressing political and
administrative aspects.
There may be truth in the Government’s claim that 60 per cent of the work has
already been completed – give or take some, if one insists, either way. The
international community had only criticisms and complaints when the Government
went ahead with rehabilitation and reconstruction without involving them mostly.
It was particularly so after Colombo point-blank refused to allow INGOs to do
work at ground level. Yet, through the last months of the war, it had no problem
allowing a team of Indian army doctors to work with the civilian victims of the
war. Nor did it have problems having Indian de-mining teams on ‘ground zero’,
almost from day one! Obviously, it has had to do with attitudes and approach –
and on either side.
The Government’s reservations had their roots in proven cases of INGOs working
not with war victims, as mandated, but possibly for the LTTE’s war efforts,
It’s unfortunate that the international community, comprising nations and
organisations, are not known to have investigated the Sri Lankan Government’s
charges of such collusion. If they have done so, internally alone and without
involving Colombo, that should also in a way support the relevance of an
internal inquiry of the LLRC kind. Otherwise, accountability, it would seem, was
for others, not for the self.
Belatedly though, the Government has given accountability on LLRC implementation
the highest importance. With President’s Secretary, Lalith Weeratunga, chairing
the committee and responsibilities fixed at all levels and down the line, the
non-implementation of specific aspects of the Report could be tackled
officially, if gaps are found, and motives become suspect. If successful, the
model could be adopted as an operational manual for Governments of the size
across the world, and not just by those coming out of war. If not, it could
become a manual on accountability.
If implementation becomes successful, the international community could become
irrelevant to the process, so could be the original issues that triggered the
LLRC Report in the first place. It would have become a manual for
nation-building, not just for Sri Lanka but elsewhere, too. Given the level of
corruption seeping into Third World democracies in particular, accountability of
the kind is what nations could do with. Yet, post-implementation assessments
should be realistic, to be effective. It cannot be dogmatic.
The Post-facto on rehabilitation and reconstruction, the international community
seems not dissatisfied with the Government’s efforts since the conclusion of war
– or, even during the war. The reservations cropped up in between. It owed to
the enormity of the job on hand and an inherent belief that Third World nations
could not cope with it, even if the efforts were genuine, without a role of
choice for the international community. Yet, there is great reluctance on their
part to acknowledge success stories as loudly as the complaints about ‘failures’
as they deem.
This behaviour was true of the Cold War era, too. India housed one of the
largest refugee populations at the height of the ‘Bangladesh War’ in 1971, and
even afterward. On the Sri Lankan front, the South Indian State of Tamil Nadu
has some of the best organised refugee camps spread across the State and
operational for over 25 years. In recent years, the refugee camps, for instance,
had electricity (for their school-going children to prepare for their exams in
the host nations) while the rest of the neighbourhood would suffer hours of
power-cuts. Successive Governments, both in the State and at the Centre, have
been upgrading the conditions within the camps and for the refugees.
Ask the INGOs, and then they would tell you what is lacking in India, not what
is happening there. For instance, they are always perturbed about India not
enacting a refugee law, as yet. Pressure-tactic may be one way of keeping
Governments on the track, but it could prove counter-productive after a time.
This is again a lesson from Sri Lanka. India, for instance, does what it deems
fit is right and necessary. It has not bent backward to accommodate the concerns
of the international community that do not relate to ground realities.
In the post-Cold War era, INGOs have arrogated to themselves the role of the
‘international civil society’ and hold near-exclusive rights to ‘international
consciousness’. They work on class-room driven, text-book standards of
conflict-resolution. It is a big business in itself, with large funds whose
sources, if traced, could well lead to Governments. It is not any more your
mom-and-pop Sunday church collections for distributing de-hydrated milk powder,
much-needed medicines and tents to victims of war and natural calamity. At one
time, INGOs, going by the name of ‘voluntary agencies’, used to be known and
understood in Third World nations , as such. Not any more.
Post-Cold War era in particular is strewn with INGOs and other sections of the
international community, wanting to do the good deed for the day, that of a Boy
Scout assuming the role of a Good Samaritan. Their efforts at
conflict-resolution were and are genuine, in most cases, for starters at the
very least. Their understanding of the ground situation, their self-assumed
perceptions and intentions of the stake-holders, and their unsubstantiated
desire for creating a level-playing field all have proved to be
counter-productive, in more cases than one.
There is also their faith and belief on who is the victim in a given
circumstance. It could be the State in the Israel-Palestine issue, the non-State
Tamil player in Sri Lanka. While a discerning approach is what it should be,
there are no defining parameters, however. This has made their involvement in
peace-building and conflict-resolution, untenable after a time. Which is also
what makes local efforts of the LLRC and South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, even more relevant.
The question remains. Whose concerns are the Sri Lankan Government addressing?
Is it that of the international community or of the ‘Tamil victims’ of the war?
If it is that of the former, there seems to be some acceptance of the
Government’s efforts at rehabilitation and reconstruction. But there again, the
local Tamil population and their political leadership – particularly those that
are not a part of the Government – are not satisfied. They have huge concerns
and genuine complaints, as genuine as war-victims can be expected to have.
For any effort of the LLRC Roadmap to produce results that are not contested on
a later day, the international community has to engage the Tamils, the Diaspora
and those in Sri Lanka, to ensure that they are on the same page. This should be
more so, if the intention of the Tamil constituency in particular is to contest
the Government in Sri Lanka, whatever the certificate of the international
community. At the end of the day, Governments in the West are dogmatic on HR
issues only as far as it goes. They are pragmatic, when it comes to
constituency-driven electoral agendas of individual politicians, at times,
starting with the Prime Minister of the day at the top!
The Colombo Government can be expected not wanting to be dictated by the
international community, or the Diaspora Tamils, on details. It is not only a
question of sovereignty. It is also about practicality. The Sri Lankan
post-tsunami experience showed that Governments and INGOs dumped money without
question. There was no accountability then, and no proven results, hence. The
INGOs were possibly happy with account books and audit reports, not bothering to
find out if the funded projects did measure up! Then of course was the question
of their own motives, and the ‘Stockholm Syndrome’ that might have also
afflicted some of their partners, local and otherwise!
‘The proof of the pudding is in the eating’. The Government has to ensure that
its current efforts, stretched over the medium-term, do not leave behind an
after-taste of frustration in all stake-holders and for exactly opposite
reasons. One way to check against this on the home front is to involve the
elected representatives of the target-population in the ongoing efforts. If
nothing else, the Government could consider setting up overseeing citizen’s
committees at all levels, for inputs that could become genuine after a time.
That way, it could engage sections of the Tamil population distanced from the
Government and daily administration by LTTE threats over decades, to begin
gaining hands-on experience that they possibly do not know exists and that they
need to equip themselves with!
Accountability is not only about rehabilitation and reconstruction. The
Government also needs to look at the political reconciliation process as a part
of the Roadmap efforts. With the war three years behind the nation, the
Government needs to ensure that it is on the same page as the victim population
on matters of reconciliation issues, specifics and generic. There could be
differences and distinctions on what should be done, or how it should be done.
The current initiative can have meaning, either way, only if the Government
knows for sure what issues are on the table, and there would not be additions
and sub-divisions as they progress.
The post-war scenario instead witnessed multiplicity of such concerns, each
pushing back the earlier one to the background, but still hanging out there and
capable of being picked up at will and thrown at the Government. After a time,
it overwhelmed the handlers, including the complaining nations. They then had to
‘fix’ it, and the UNHRC resolution, became a tool rather than the cure.
Where the Government has failed on this score, it should address those issues
too, as a part of the current Roadmap. The aborted talks with the TNA are one
such. If a PSC is the way forward for the Government, it could set a time-frame
for itself, to address identified issues and concerns for either side. It need
not always be one-sided, as in the past. The Government should not fight shy of
naming its security concerns, if any, for instance, and then take the blame for
consequential delays on other fronts, which it is shy of acknowledging.
Yet, questions would remain, as with the four to five year period sought for
investigating war-crimes, if it could be called so, and bringing identifiable
culprits to book. On the face of it, the time-line could read like deception.
Third World crime-and-punishment is a story in itself, particularly the years
consumed by the legal and judicial process. There could even be hope that the
world would have become kinder over that period. A lot would again depend on the
progress made or not on other fronts, starting with power-devolution and other
aspects of political reconciliation!