Renewal of Ahmed Shaheed's Mandate And the Futility of Denial Diplomacy

Yesterday, the UN Human Rights Council voted 22 for, 5 against, and 20 abstained to renew the mandate of Ahmed Shaheed, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights on Iran for another year, facing a whole year of efforts by Iran's human rights diplomacy headed by Mohammad Javad Larijani, Head of the Judiciary's Human Rights Council, whose mission has been to discredit or ignore the SP's mandate.

Exactly one year ago, the Human Rights council angered the Iranian authorities by choosing a special mechanism for the review of the situation of human rights in Iran and appointment of a Special Rapporteur.  During the past year, despite his repeated requests, Ahmed Shaheed was not able to receive permission to enter Iran, but during this time delivered the commitment stipulated in his mandate by presenting two reports.

Extending Ahmed Shaheed's mission puts Iran's diplomacy in a very difficult position after, during a television program on IRIB, Javad Larijani called him "stupid," having called him "biased" and "ignorant" during a Council meeting two weeks earlier.  Shaheed's insistence on extensive tackling of issues pertaining to the systematic violations of human rights, and the votes he was able to collect from Council members, not only neutralized Mr. Larijani's main strategy of denial, deflection, discrediting, and lack of cooperation with the UN as a means of confronting the special mechanism, it also led to the unprecedented isolation of the Islamic Republic of Iran within the UN, the political consequences of which is evaluated to go far beyond the Human Rights Council.

Considered one of the most-experienced Iranian diplomats, Javad Larijani has been the manager of the Islamic Republic's human rights project at an international level, and for this reason has been largely responsible for the existing situation of confronting the United Nations and its member states.  After the publication of Ahmed Shaheed's 12 March report, followed closely by the 21 March report of UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, both of which emphasized the continued violations of human rights and Iran's lack of cooperation with different UN human rights mechanisms, the question arises whether, especially after the 2009 presidential election that was accompanied with the intensified and extended violations of human rights in Iran, policies and strategies adopted by Javad Larijani as the architect and executor of the Islamic Republic's human rights policies have now ended his mission inside the Iranian Judiciary?

The Angry Diplomat and "the Zionist Mafia"

Those who know Javad Larijani closely, do not remember him as an angry man.  But during Ahmed Shaheed's presentation of his report on 12 March, the 61-year-old, Najaf-born diplomat appeared so angry and outraged that the head of the session had to cut off his microphone and remind him to respect the meeting.  This is an unprecedented action that showed he was not at all satisfied with the human rights case, the way it was managed, and that the consequences of the adopted policies have in no way been fulfilling for him.  The interesting point is that the text of his presentation, which was distributed to the audience, was vastly different from what he read at the meeting, a subject that astonished many.

He called Ahmed Shaheed's and the Secretary General's reports a new phenomenon that is a result of "US domination" and "the Zionist Mafia."  Such choice of language by Mr. Larijani, who on the one hand talked about cooperating with UN mechanisms and on the other questioned the UN decision-making system, in effect showed the confusion in the Iranian delegation's thinking and decision-making process.

Considering that the United Nations is an inter-governmental organization whose decisions are based on picking political friends and the usual groupings and public opinion pressure from the civil society and international media, abandoning accountability about the points raised in UN resolutions against Iran and repeated use of verbal attacks, though possibly useful for Tehran's extremist media, seriously compromised Javad Larijani's position as head of the Iran Human Rights Delegation, as well as Iran's position in this area of the UN.

By appointing Javad Larijani, who is well-known as "the negotiator," (and whose famous quote is that he would "negotiate with the devil in the depths of hell for the regime's interests"), as Head of Iran's Human Rights Council, it was expected that a closer relationship between UN human rights mechanisms and the Iranian Judiciary would emerge and that objections to the conditions of human rights in Iran would decrease through the presence of UN authorities and reporters.

Of course, the 2009 post-election events that were accompanied by widespread arrests of political activists and violations of Iranian citizens' basic rights had provided for very difficult conditions for Larijani, and the multiple UN resolutions against Iran were only one example of those results.

Iran's Four-Point Human Rights Strategy: The Recipe For Failure

A review of Iran's human rights diplomacy over the past two years indicates that the Iranian Judiciary's representative, Javad Larijani's strategy was based on four main points.  First, was to consistently speak of cooperating with the United Nations, but to simultaneously prevent UN reporters from achieving their missions in Iran or answering their questions properly.

Second, was to call every effort to discuss the subject of human rights in Iran, including efforts to issue resolutions or to appoint a special rapporteur, as "doings of the western countries," and therefore to call every such action as "political," thereby, evading accountability about the raised questions.  Third, was, instead of providing answers about specific cases or sensitive trends on topics such as executions, torture, and arbitrary arrests, raised by the Special Rapporteur, to express Iran's dedication to thematic reporters or the UPR. (Although no thematic rapporteurs have traveled to Iran since 2005 and of the more than 100 suggestions made during Iran's UPR, very few have been addressed.)

And last, the refusal to allow the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights to enter the country and to question the sources and the credibility of his report, considering it was prepared outside the country, was another strategy set by the Iranian Judiciary and carried out in unison by Iran's Parliament and other government media and organizations.

But statistics and numbers pertaining to Iran's cooperation with the UN were completely different from the statements of Iranian authorities.  During the past two years, Javad Larijani has repeatedly said that he has invited Ms. Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, to travel to Iran, stating that the invitation is an indication of Iran's willingness to cooperate with the UN human rights mechanisms.  Though the invitation was made, Iran did not cooperate in providing the requirements for the trip.  In item 44 of his 20 March report, Ban Ki Moon describes this topic in detail.  In fact, prior to traveling to Tehran, Ms. Navi Pillay sent a delegation to Tehran.  According to Mr. Ban Ki Moon's report, they advised the Iranian government during their trip that the High Commissioner will travel to Tehran when she is allowed to visit with the opposition leaders (Messrs Mousavi and Karroubi and Ms. RahnavaRD), who are currently under house arrest, and certain political prisoners, as well as independent civil society activists.  Unable to oblige such requests, the Iranian authorities decided to forgo the visit.

According to Item 42 of this report, different sections of UN human rights organizations raised 17 questions of Iranian authorities in 2011, and only one of those questions were answered.

Iran's lack of cooperation with the different UN human rights mechanisms did not go unnoticed by other countries and even without the political nature of UN voting, this point alone would have sufficed for renewing Mr. Shaheed's mandate.

Calling the passed resolutions "American," or attributing them to what Mr. Larijani called "The Zionist Mafia," was also an act of shooting oneself in the foot.  Attacking the United Nations inside the United Nations and disrespecting and questioning the countries' independence in their decision making was another strategy that acted against itself and in effect failed to convince any additional countries to oppose the resolution or the renewal of Ahmed Shaheed's mandate.

Mr. Larijani's hope to convince the High Commissioner for Human Rights or Council members to dispatch thematic rapporteurs in place of a country-specific Special Rapporteur, was also futile.  In fact it is unprecedented for Council members to vote for a thematic reporter when a Special Rapporteur has been assigned to a country.  It was reported that Iran had suggested admitting two thematic reporters to Iran, if Ahmed Shaheed's mandate were suspended.  Many believed, however, that even if thematic reporters were to be dispatched to Tehran, they would have to accompany Ahmed Shaheed, not replace him.

And finally, it appears that Larijani's last effort to confront Ahmed Shaheed's report, much like his first one, was to discredit the testimonials, documents, and cases reported in the report.

A Late Response, A Futile Effort

Mr. Shaheed began collecting data, conducting interviews, and writing his second report in October 2011.  He sent his report to Tehran in early January 2012, so that Iranian authorities could state their opinions about each of the raised points.  More than 100 victims of violations of human rights have been interviewed for this report.  Iranian authorities had close to two months to respond to every one of the items.  But instead, the two brothers, Javad and Sadegh Larijani, put attacking the report and the Special Rapporteur on their agenda.

Mr. Shaheed spoke directly with more than one hundred individuals and their families, whether in Iran or abroad.  Many of these individuals provided first-hand documents to him.  In fact, his report only reflected a part of the collected information the accuracy of which was ensured.  The UN Human Rights apparatus seems to have a high degree of confidence in the quality of the report and the accuracy of the statements and the validity of the raised concerns.

This is why when Iran adopted verbal attacks and lack of cooperation with the various UN agendas instead of responding to the raised issues, member states of the Council and other UN authorities  did not doubt that the only way Iran's human rights crisis could remain in the spotlight would be to renew Ahmed Shaheed's mandate.

Despite full-time denials of the Special Rapporteur's report, when Javad Larijani arrived in Geneva, he had a 27-page report with himself.  Though the report that bears the appearance of a formal response only addresses a very small number of the cases mentioned in Mr. Shaheed's report, its preparation by the Iranian government indicates that even the Iranian diplomatic delegation had concluded during the last days that their empty-handed appearance at the Council would weaken them.  The response was not submitted within the stipulated time; it was handed to Ahmed Shaheed and the Human Rights Council after Javad Larijani's arrival.  A glance at Iran's responses about some of the cases such as the students banned from continuing their education, which Tehran has entirely denied, is clearly against all documents and evidence that exist in this area.  In some cases, the Iranian government's responses don't even match court documents about some political prisoners.

It is not clear whether the Islamic Republic of Iran's main policies about human rights and cooperation with international organizations such as the UN are determined inside the Iranian Judiciary or in offices inside its Ministry of Intelligence, or the Intelligence Unit of the IRGC, or even the Supreme Leader's organization.  But Javad Larijani's performance as Head of the Judiciary's Human rights Council, which poses him as Iran's Number one diplomacy figure in charge of explaining Iran's policies and conduct vis a vis its observation of human rights standards, especially as pertains his unusual behavior during the recent Human Rights Council meeting, indicate that Iran's "offensive" and "denial-oriented" diplomacy not only has become ineffective, it has mobilized a large consensus against the Islamic Republic.

Considering Javad Larijani's inability to build coalitions with other UN member states, or convincing them, and in view of his aggressive conduct, expecting him and his team to create changes in the existing situation in Iran appears highly unlikely, unless spectacular changes develop in the way Iran cooperates with the UN and different human rights mechanisms, which seems highly unlikely, considering the Iranian authorities' stances vis a vis different issues and the domination of intelligence organizations over the Iranian Judiciary.

As prevalent in diplomatic norms, when a group of diplomats' mission proves fruitless, or when the existing state of affairs deteriorates for whatever reasons, changing the current team becomes the first step for changing the situation and ending the crisis.  Over the past months, especially during the recent meeting, Javad Larijani has directed words and allegations against the UN and its member states, making it very difficult for him to have an impact on Iran's human rights case over the coming months.  It would therefore not be unexpected for him to be replaced by other or others during the coming weeks.  Continuing the current standstill leaves options open for taking Iran's case to the General Assembly, and under certain cicrumstances, would pave the way for it to be forwarded to the Security Council or international courts.  This poses the ultimate nightmare for those Iranian authorities who violate human rights.